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Abstract—Along with the development of wireless communi-
cation technology, a mass of mobile devices are gaining stronger
sensing capability, which brings a novel paradigm to light:
participatory sensing networks (PSNs). PSNs can greatly reduce
the cost of wireless sensor networks, and hence are becoming an
efficient way to obtain abundant sensing data from surrounding
environment. Therefore, PSNs would lead to significant im-
provement in various fields, including cognitive communication.
However, the large-scale deployment of participatory sensing
applications is hindered by the lack of incentive mechanism,
security and privacy concerns. It is still an ongoing issue to
address all three aspects simultaneously in PSNs. In this paper,
we construct an efficient privacy-preserving incentive scheme
without trusted third party (TTP) for PSNs to motivate user-
participation. This scheme allows each participant to earn credits
by contributing data privately. Using blind and partially blind
signatures, the proposed scheme is proved to be secure for privacy
and incentive. Additionally, the performance evaluation in terms
of computation and storage indicates that the proposed scheme
has higher efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, mobile phones have made great progress
in processing power, storage capacities, embedded sensors
(e.g., accelerometer, GPS, microphone), and communication
capabilities. The rapid penetration of mobile phones not only
changed the traditional internet service model, but also in-
creased the diversity of applications. One of the applications
is based on the data collected by the sensors in the power-
ful mobile phones, the emerging application—participatory
sensing networks (PSNs) [1]. PSNs are greatly helpful to
the improvement of cognitive communication that combines
perception, information processing, artificial intelligence and
machine learning together.
A PSN system is essentially a wireless sensor network
(WSN) formed by ubiquitous sensors. However, compared
with traditional WSNs, sensors are no need to pre-distributed
in PSNs, which reduces setup cost. Moreover, people-centric
PSNs provide better spatial and temporal coverage. A basic
framework of PSNs is shown in Fig. 1. Participants collect
sensing data through the sensors embedded in smart terminals
and upload these information to a cloud server. The server
integrates and analyzes all the sensing data, then shares the
results with the corresponding customers. Therefore, partici-
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Fig. 1. A Basic framework of PSNs
pants are not only the data providers in PSNs, but also the
consumers and ultimate beneficiaries.
Since the concept of PSN was initially presented in 2006,
it has been widely applied to environmental monitoring [2],
traffic route navigation [3], health care [4], etc. In addi-
tion, PSNs have made a greater contribution in participa-
tory cognitive radio networks [5]. However, in various of
application scenarios, PSNs have to face to many security
challenges [6]–[19]. Although there are some methods [20]–
[23], the critical challenge that the contradiction between
privacy preservation and incentive mechanism, which hinders
the large-scale deployment of mobile sensing applications.
Without reasonable and secure reward, participants may not
be willing to spend time, effort or money on any sensing task.
Therefore, an appropriate incentive mechanism is necessary to
stimulate participants’ enthusiasm and persistence. However,
the identities and other sensitive information of participants
may be abused by the cloud server in the incentive scheme.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose an efficient privacy-
preserving incentive scheme to meet requirement of security
and privacy preservation in PSNs.
Although there have been plenty of research efforts on
privacy preservation in PSNs [24]–[26], most of them do not
consider incentive mechanisms for participants. Cristofaro et
al. [25] proposed a secure framework of participant-sensing
instead of the detailed algorithm. Kapadia et al. [26] proposed
a scheme to gather sensing data anonymously, named Anony-
Sense. Nevertheless, in these schemes, it is still an open issue
that there is few appropriate incentives involved in the sensing
task to attract more users’ participation.
In addition, many studies of incentive mechanisms in PSNs
have appeared gradually. In [27], Lee et al. proposed a reverse
auction scheme based on dynamic price, named RADP. Yang
et al. [28] presented two incentive models based on the
games and auctions from the perspective of data requestors
and participants separately. Nonetheless, there are no privacy-
preserving measures in these schemes, so the users’ privacy is
likely to be leaked. It may cause unnecessary troubles.
Until now, the joint-design on the above two issues still
has not attracted sufficient research attention. They urgently
need to be considered for adapting the extensive applications
of PSNs. For instance, one of the most effective solutions,
the pseudonym, is used to conceal a participant’s real identity
in PSNs. In this scheme, each participant generates his/her
tokens and commitments in cooperation with the server using
blind and partially blind signature to protect privacy against
the attacks by any third party. In this paper, we propose an
efficient privacy-preserving incentive scheme without trusted
third party (TTP) through a credit-based approach, which
allows each user to earn credits by contributing sensing data
without leaking his/her privacy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II,
we briefly introduce some preliminaries including the system
model, threats models, cryptographic primitives, etc. In section
III, we describe the proposed scheme in detail and analyze its
security properties. In section IV, the performance is evaluated.
Finally, we conclude the paper in section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
Recently, some models have been proposed for data col-
lection or processing [29], [30]. In this paper, we propose
a people-centric model for the privacy-preserving incentive
scheme, as shown in Fig. 2. We define three different entities
that are identified as follows:
• Sensing Data Requestor (SDR): The SDRs send queries
to the sensing server for the desired statistics and context
data. As customers of PSN services, they need to indicate
which types of data they are interested in obtaining.
• Sensing Participant (SP): The SPs are responsible for
collecting the relevant data with sensors and uploading
them to the sensing server via 3G/4G or Wi-Fi.
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Fig. 2. System model
• Sensing Server (SS): The SS manages the PSN services to
facilitate effective sharing of data between SPs and SDRs.
The SS collects sensing reports from the SPs and answers
the SDRs based on analysis results on the collected data.
The basic workflow is described as follows. When an SDR
requires some data, it needs to send a query to the SS. The
SS transforms the query into one or more tasks and publishes
them to a task queue. If the SP decides to take part in a
certain task, he/she will collect sensing data in accordance with
the task requirements and summarize a report with a random
pseudonym. Then, he/she submits the report to the SS using a
new pseudonym. Accordingly, the SS pays a certain number of
credits to the corresponding SP. After obtaining enough data
reports, the SS integrates and analyzes all reports, then sends
feedback to the SDR.
B. Threat Models
1) Threats to incentive
With respect to incentive, we assume that the SS is honest.
On receiving valid virtual credits from SPs, the SS will not
repudiate to pay. Otherwise, it would affect SPs’ enthusiasm
to participate in the sensing task in the future. In this case,
we assume there exist two types of threats to the incentive
mechanisms: firstly, a dishonest SP may upload the same data
report repeatedly or reuse expired credit tokens in an attempt
to obtain more credits than allowed; secondly, a malicious SP
may compromise the other SPs for their credit tokens, or forge
the tokens to earn more credits.
2) Threats to privacy
We assume that the SS may be curious about which tasks
have been accepted or which reports have been submitted by
SPs. Thus, there are also two types of threats to privacy of
the SPs in this case. On one hand, the SS tries to link the
identities of participants to some reports that may contain
sensitive information. On the other hand, a malicious server
may attempt to infer a certain participant’ real identity through
multiple tasks requested by him/her.
C. Cryptographic Primitives
1) Pseudonym: Due to the pseudonym, no entity can link
a submitted report to the actual participant. To the best of our
knowledge, the pseudonym is an effective solution to protect
SPs’ privacy. It is difficult for an adversary to establish a
relationship between a participant and the data report from
a randomized ID instead of the actual ID.
2) Blind Signature: Blind signature was first introduced by
D. Chaum in 1983, which can effectively protect the content
of the messages that need to be signed. Due to properties of
blindness, untraceability and unforgeability, blind signature is
often used in electronic cash protocols to protect privacy.
3) Partially blind signature: In partially blind signature,
there is a part of common information should be pre-agreed
upon (e.g., index of task). Similarly, the signer is not allowed
to know the other part of information. Thus, he/she cannot
link the signature to the communication session from which
the signature is obtained.
D. Assumptions
In this paper, we put forward following three assumptions:
• Firstly, we assume that the SS and each SP have several
pairs of public/private keys issued by a certified authority
to authenticate each other.
• Secondly, we suppose that each task can only be re-
quested once by each participant.
• Thirdly, we assume that users’ mobile phones should be
kept securely.
III. AN EFFICIENT PRIVACY-PRESERVING INCENTIVE
SCHEME WITHOUT TTP IN PSNS
To solve the contradiction between privacy preservation
and incentive mechanism, we propose an efficient privacy-
preserving incentive scheme without TTP for PSNs. In the
scheme, we combine three types of techniques: pseudonyms,
blind signature and partially blind signature together to protect
the privacy of SPs.
A. Design Objectives
The proposed scheme should provide a reasonable incentive
mechanism to maintain users’ enthusiasm for their participa-
tion, and ensure that attackers cannot get users’ sensitive infor-
mation. In terms of incentive, SPs can obtain corresponding
credits by completing the sensing tasks. In general, an SP
can earn at most cmax credits from the task published by the
SS. With respect to privacy-preserving, when the SP requests
multiple tasks, the SS is unable to link these tasks to it. Also,
the SS cannot link the uploaded reports to it.
B. Privacy-Preserving Incentive Scheme in PSNs
In PSNs, the SS may publish many tasks in batch in a
certain time slot, namely task windows. In chronological order,
various tasks are distributed in these windows. Without loss of
generality, we consider the first task window. The tasks in this
window are numbered 1, 2, ...,M . The SS needs to maintain
a list of tokens for each task.
In the proposed scheme, we use blind and partially blind
signature in [31] to protect SPs’ sensitive information. The
primary notations used in this paper are given in TABLE I.
The SS generates the private/public key pair d and e for RSA
TABLE I
NOTATIONS
Notations Description
e, d The public/private keys for blind RSA signature
K1,K2 The SS’s private keys for partially blind signature
r1, r2, r3 The secure numbers of SP
ci ∈ [cmin, cmax] The number of credits paid to SP for a task
γi, δij , εij Request token, report token, credit token
H A cryptographic hash function
Ti A timestamp
RID,PID The real identity and pseudonym of an SP
signature and blind RSA signature, two private keys K1,K2
for partially blind signature. Each SP randomly selects three
secure numbers: r1, r2 and r3. These keys and numbers should
be kept unchanged in different task windows. In addition, the
SP also need to choose different pseudonyms and a one-way
hash function H .
1) Task Request: The SS first publishes some tasks includ-
ing the requirements, the deadline and a possible range of
credit ci ∈ [cmin, cmax]. If an SP decides to take part in the
task i (i ∈ [1,M ]), he/she should communicate with the SS to
request this task by using a pseudonym PID1. Firstly, the SP
negotiates the common information i with the SS and requests
RSA signature on the hash value of RID to prove his/her
identity in the credit deposit phase. Secondly, if the SS agrees
with the common information, it returns the signature in an
approval message:
SS → SP : signd(H(RID)) (1)
Then, the SP selects a random number r1 and computes a
request token identifier τi = H(i||H(r1)) to ask for a partially
blind signature on 〈i, τi〉. The SS signs blinded 〈i, τi〉 with
its private key K1 and returns the signature to the SP. So
the SP can obtain PBSK1(i, τi) as the commitment and set
γi = 〈i, τi, PBSK1(i, τi)〉 as the request token. Note that the
SP can only obtain one request token with τi for the task.
Finally, the SP sends the request token to the SS:
SP → SS : PID1, i, τi, PBSK1(i, τi) (2)
On receiving the SP’s request token, the SS verifies the
correctness of the signature PBSK1(i, τi). If it is valid, the
SS sends the initial price cmax to the SP. At the same time,
the SS stores the used request token into its list to prevent the
SP from reusing it.
2) Report Submission: In order to obtain the report token,
the SP does as follows:
- Choose a random number r2 and compute a credit to-
ken identifier mij = H(i||j||H(r2))||signd(H(RID)),
where j = 1, 2, ..., cmax;
- Select a random number r3 and compute blind factor
zij = H(i||j||H(r3));
- Generate the blinded message µij = (mij ×
zeij) mod q. The report token identifier is bic =
H(µi1||µi2||...||µicmax ||i||cmax);
- Request a partially blind signature on 〈i, bic〉 using an-
other random pseudonym PID2.
Upon receiving the request from the SP, the SS signs blinded
〈i, bic〉 with its private key K2 and delivers the signature
to the SP. After removing the blind factor, the SP obtains
PBSK2(i, bic) as the commitment. Therefore, the report token
for this task is δic = 〈i, bic, PBSK2(i, bic)〉. Note that the SP
can only get one report token with bic for the task. Then, the
SP encrypts the data report with the SS’s public key e. The
SP submits the report for task i, the report token, the blinded
message and a timestamp:
SP → SS :PID2, i, bic, PBSK2(i, bic)
ui1, ui2, ..., uicmax , Ti, Ee(report)
(3)
Next, the SS verifies if bic = H(µi1||µi2||...||µicmax ||i||cmax)
holds. If it dose, the SS knows that µij (j = 1, 2, ..., cmax)
has also been committed for task i and then verifies signature
PBSK2(i, bic). If the signature is valid, it means that bic has
been committed for task i. Therefore, the SS stores the legal
report token into its list. Furthermore, the SS decides to deliver
a certain amount of credit c (c ≤ cmax) to the SP according
to the task difficulty, data quality and other relevant factors.
The SS signs (µij ‖ Ti) (j = 1, 2, ..., c) with its private key:
SS → SP : signd(µi1 ‖ Ti), ..., signd(µic ‖ Ti) (4)
Upon receiving signd(µij ‖ Ti), the SP removes the blinding
factor zeij mod q to get blind RSA signature signd(mij ‖
Ti). In this way, the SP obtains c credit tokens εij =
〈mij , signd(mij ‖ Ti)〉, (j = 1, 2, ..., c). Without submitting
the report, the SP cannot obtain any credit token.
3) Credit Deposit: After getting these credit tokens
〈mij , signd(mij ‖ Ti)〉, the SP can only submit one credit
token at a time using his/her real identity RID. So, to mitigate
timing attacks, all credit tokens need to be uploaded c times
in a random interval:
SP → SS : RID, Ti,m, signd(m ‖ Ti) (5)
After receiving the credit token, the SS verifies if the times-
tamp Ti is expired. If it is not, the SS does the following steps:
1) verify the signature signd(m ‖ Ti) with its public key e;
2) verify RID by extracting signd(H(RID)) from m. If two
signatures are both valid, the SP’s credit account can be added
by one. At the same time, the SS stores these credit tokens
into its list to avoid replay attacks. The flow chart of the above
phases is illustrated in Fig. 3.
4) Token Renewal: For each task, the SS maintains a list of
the used tokens to avoid reusing. When a task is completed,
the corresponding request tokens and report tokens in the list
should be released. However, the credit tokens will be released
until all tasks in the same window have been finished or
expired. Then, the SPs can request the following M tasks
whose indexes are kM + 1, kM + 2, ..., (k + 1)M (k ≥ 0) if
they are willing.
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Fig. 3. Program flow chart of the proposed scheme
C. Security Analysis
In this part, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme
in terms of incentive and privacy. We first give the linkability
between different tokens and objects in Fig. 4.
1) Attacks on Incentive:
Proposition 1. The proposed scheme can prevent dishonest
SPs from earning more than their due credits.
Proof: Since the SP binds the commitment in each request or
report token to the task index through partially blind signature,
he/she cannot use the request or report token for another task.
Although the SP does not bind the credit tokens to the task
index, the credit tokens can not be reused for another task in
this window. Because the used credit tokens have been stored
in the SS’s list. Besides, the timestamp Ti can resist replay
attacks, so dishonest SPs can not reuse the credit tokens in
the following task windows for more credits.
Proposition 2. The proposed scheme can prevent malicious
SPs from compromising the other SPs or forging the credit
tokens to earn more credits.
Proof:A malicious SP may compromise the other SPs for their
credit tokens, but he/she still cannot earn any credit. Since each
credit token is associated with the SP’s real identity RID, the
SS will not offer the credit to the other SPs. Furthermore,
it is impossible for the malicious SP to forge the signature
signd(H(RID)), because the private key d is kept secretly
by the SS. Thus, the credit tokens 〈mij , signd(mij ‖ Ti)〉
cannot be forged.
2) Attacks on Privacy:
Proposition 3. The SS cannot link tasks to the corresponding
SP.
Proof: Since the SP requests tasks with different random
pseudonyms in the task request phase, so the SS cannot
distinguish if two different pseudonyms belong to the same SP.
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Fig. 4. The linkability between different components
Thus, the SS is unable to link the tasks to the corresponding
SP.
Proposition 4. The SS cannot link a report to the correspond-
ing SP.
Proof: The SP uploads a report with a random pseudonym
instead of his/her real identity in the report submission phase.
Meanwhile, due to the untraceability of the partially blind
signature, the SS cannot link the uploaded report to the
corresponding SP’s real identity, as shown in Fig. 4.
Proposition 5. The SS cannot link the credit tokens to a certain
report.
Proof: Though, in the credit deposit phase, the SP submits
the credit tokens with his/her real identity RID, the SS cannot
link the credit token to the corresponding report token, because
the connection between mij and uij is covered by zij in blind
RSA signature.
Within a short time, a task may be completed by one or a
few SPs. In this case, if an SP deposits multiple credit tokens
once, the SS may directly link the report to this SP. Thus, the
SPs need to deposit one credit token at a time to prevent the
SS from linking the credit tokens to the report.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the performance of the proposed
scheme in terms of storage cast and computation overhead. For
the experimental evaluation, the simulation environment is set
up in Ubuntu 16.04 with an Intel(R) Core i5-4200U 1.60GHz
×2 processor and 2.2GB memory. The proposed scheme will
be run 100 times in order to compensate for the randomness
of the results.
A. Storage Cost
The SS needs to store a request token and a report token
for one task until this task is finished. Also, it requires to
store at most M × cmax credit tokens until all tasks in one
task window are completed. Hence, the storage overhead is
not heavy for the SS. After submitting the report for the task,
the SP is required to store c credit tokens delivered by the SS.
By contrast, in [32], each SP needs storing M(2× cmax +1)
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commitments for the next M tasks, so our scheme achieves
lower storage cost for the SP.
TABLE II
THE RUNNING TIME OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
PBS SIG H
SS 13.887ms 5.037ms 3.421ms
SP 4.279ms 0.469ms 0.015ms
TABLE III
TIME CONSUMPTION
Task application Report submission Credit deposit Total time
SS 17.924ms 38.109ms 4.705ms 60.738ms
SP 4.793ms 11.698ms - 16.698ms
B. Computation Overhead
In the simulation procedure, the computation overhead is
primarily caused by several major cryptographic operations.
Table II shows the running time of the cryptographic prim-
itives. “PBS” denotes a partially blind signature, “SIG”
denotes an RSA signature, and “H” denotes a hash operation.
Table III indicates the processing time of each phase in our
scheme when M = 1 and c = 5. On the SS side, the task
request, report submission, and credit deposit phases only take
several milliseconds. On the SP side, it just takes a short time
for several one-way hash functions running in the terminal
devices. Since the SP deposits one credit token each time
in the credit deposit phase to protect participants’ privacy,
the SS has to sign more credit tokens, which may lead to a
little more computation burden in the report submission phase.
However, the processing time can be reduced if more efficient
signature scheme is deployed instead of RSA signature. With
the increase of the number of PSN tasks, the time consumption
in the SS is still reasonable, as shown in Fig. 5. Additionally,
according to the rough test, the communication overhead
is about one thousandth of the computation overhead, so
we ignore the communication overhead in the performance
evaluation. In summary, our scheme takes reasonable com-
putational overhead to meet the privacy-preserving inventive
requirements in PSNs.
V. CONCLUSION
To facilitate the large-scale deployment of participa-
tory sensing applications, we propose an efficient privacy-
preserving incentive scheme without TTP to solve the conflict
between participants’ privacy and incentive in the participatory
sensing networks. By combining of timestamp and nonce
tokens, it can prevents replay attacks effectively, so dishonest
users cannot reuse different tokens. Also, a malicious SS
cannot link the reports or tasks to the corresponding SP.
Security analysis indicates that the proposed scheme meets the
security and privacy-preserving requirements in PSNs. Finally,
the performance evaluation shows that the proposed scheme
achieves lower computation and storage cost.
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